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EXDIS TOSEC 4

PLEASE PASS TO DAVID LISSY OR JANE ROTHE IN SAN CLEMENTE
FOR SECRETARY ROGERS

FOLLOWING SENT TEL AVIV INFO JIDDA AMMAN KUWAIT BEIRUT LONDON
PARIS MOSCOW TEHRAN CAIRO, JUN 22, FROM SECSTATE RPTD TO
YOU:

QUOTE

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EXDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, IS, SA

SUBJECT: ISRAELI REPRESENTATION ON F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA

SUMMARY. DINITZ ON INSTRUCTIONS PRESENTED NOTE FOR
SECRETACY TO DEHSEC JUNE 22 EXPRESSING HOPE FOR USG RE-
CONSIDERATION DECISION IN PRINCIPLE SELL F-4 S TO SAUDI
ARABIA AND POSSIBLY KUWAIT. NOTE ADDUCES FOLLOWING MAIN
ARGUMENTS: ADDED AIR POWER MAY TEMPT THESE COUNTRIES TO
MORE DIRECT MILITARY ROLE IN ARAB- ISRAEL CONFLICT; DANGER

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OF TRANSFER TO COUNTRIES ACTIVELY CONFRONTING ISRAEL; SALE
IS LIKELY BE SEEN AS SYMBOLIZING NEW U. S. AREA POLICY AND
THUS WOULD PSYCHOLOGICALLY INHIBIT PROGRESS TOWARD NEGO-

TIATED SETTLEMENT; WOULD SERVE TO STIMULATE FRENCH AND SOVIETS TO ESCALATE ARMS RACE; WOULD WORK AGAINST PROMISING TRENDS IN ARAB WORLD BLOCKING WAR OPTION. IN HIS REMARKS DINITZ ELABORATED ON THESE POINTS, BUT STRESSING THROUGHOUT GOI OPPOSITION WAS DIRECTED TO ITEM OF F-4 S, NOT TO IDEA OF U. S. SUPPORT SAUDIS AND OTHER FRIENDS IN PENINSULA AREA. ISRAEL WANTED U. S. TO KNOW ITS OBJECTIONS WERE NOT AUTOMATIC OR PRO FORMA; THEY WERE SERIOUS LONG AND SHORT RANGE OBJECTIONS. DINITZ EMPHASIZED HIS CONCERN SALE OF F-4 S MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SHIFT IN U. S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST AND DESIRE AVOID APPEARANCE OF U. S.- ISRAEL RIFT OVER THIS ISSUE. DEPSEC AGREED WITH DINITZ IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE AND HARMFUL IF IMPRESSION GIVEN THERE ISRAEL- U. S.

CONFRONTATION ON THIS. OUR POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST UNCHANGED. WE GAVE ISRAELI VIEWS FULL CONSIDERATION BUT BELIEVED WE WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN AREA AND CAUSE OF PEACE BY SALE. WE DID NOT BELIEVE SALE WOULD CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER. SALE WOULD GIVE US PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE IN AREA THAT WERE IN BOTH ISRAEL'S AND OUR INTERESTS. FURTHERMORE, IT BETTER FOR SAUDIS TO HAVE PHANTOMS, OVER WHOSE USE WE COULD EXERCISE SOME CONTROL, THAN TO BUY MIRAGES FROM FRANCE WHICH WOULD CARRY HIGHER RISK OF DIVERSION IN ARAB- ISRAEL CONTEXT. DEPSEC SAID IN HIS PERSONAL VIEW REVERSAL OF U. S. DECISION WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE U. S. INFLUENCE IN AREA. END SUMMARY

1. DEPSEC RUSH RECEIVED AMB DINITZ A. M. JUNE 22 FOR ABOUT 40 MINUTES. ALSO PRESENT WERE MIN IDAN, POL CONS RAVIV, DEPASSTSEC ATHERTON, COUNTRY DIR STACKHOUSE AND VELIOTES OF DEPSEC'S STAFF.

2. DINITZ SAID PRIMARY REASON HE HAD SOUGHT APPOINTMENT IN DEPARTMENT DURING THIS BUSY WEEK WAS TO DELIVER NOTE FOREIGN MINISTER WANTED PRESENTED TO SECRETARY ON QUESTION OF ANNOUNCED U. S. PLAN TO SELL F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA AND POSSIBLY KUWAIT. AMB SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO ADD FEW WORDS TO THOSE NOT IN NOTE (TEXT NOTE BY SEPTTEL). THEY WOULD

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BE SIMILAR TO THOSE HE HAD RAISED IN HIS EARLIER MEETINGS ON SUBJECT WITH SISCO AND KISSINGER. GOI HAD NOW DECIDED TO TAKE THIS ADDITIONAL STEP TO EXPRESS ITS CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE DELIVERY OF PARTICULAR ITEM OF F-4 S.

3. DINITZ CONTINUED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT TO U. S. STRATEGY IN PROVIDING ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA. ITS THINKING WAS IN MANY RESPECTS PARALLEL TO THAT OF U. S. NOR DID ISRAEL OBJECT, GENERALLY SPEAKING, TO U. S. SUPPLYING ARMS TO COUNTRIES IN THAT AREA; IT APPRECIATED U. S. CONCERNS FOR OIL INTERESTS IN AREA, ESPECIALLY AFTER BRITISH DE-

PARTURE HAD LEFT POWER VACUUM THERE. DINITZ RECALLED THAT ISRAEL IN PAST HAD URGED U. S. TO TAKE POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON THESE MATTERS. SO ISRAEL DID NOT OBJECT STRATEGICALLY. ITS OBJECTIONS WERE TO SPECIFIC TACTICAL MANIFESTATION OF THAT STRATEGY - I. E., PROVISION OF F-4 S. REASONS FOR ISRAEL' S OBJECTIONS WERE SET FORTH IN NOTE. ISRAEL FELT THAT, INSTEAD OF CONTRIBUTING TO SEPARATING ARAB- ISRAEL ISSUES FROM ARABIAN PENINSULA MATTERS, PROVISION OF F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD CREATE LINK BETWEEN THEM. THIS WOULD NOT SERVE EITHER ISRAELI OR AMERICAN OVERALL INTERESTS IN AREA.

4. DINITZ SAID HE ALSO WANTED TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN U. S. SALE OF F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS SHIFT

IN U. S. POLICY IN MIDDLE EAST. CLOSE ISRAELI- U. S. FRIENDSHIP HAD BROUGHT TREMENDOUS BENEFITS TO BOTH COUNTRIES: IT HAD STRENGTHENED CEASE- FIRE IN AREA BROUGHT ABOUT AT U. S. INITIATIVE; IT HAD WEAKENED RUSSIAN HOLD IN AREA AND HELPED STRENGTHEN U. S. TIES WITH SOME ARAB COUNTRIES; IT HAD CREATED SITUATION IN WHICH EGYPT WAS COMING TO U. S. TO SEEK ITS ASSISTANCE IN DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE IN BEST INTERESTS BOTH ISRAEL AND U. S. DINITZ WAS CONCERNED, HE SAID, THAT DISAGREEMENT U. S. AND ISRAEL WERE HAVING OVER THIS ITEM WOULD BE INTERPRETED AS RIFT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND U. S., WHICH WAS NOT ISRAEL' S DESIRE. ISRAEL THUS FOUND ITSELF IN DELICATE SITUATION.

5. DINITZ SAID FOREIGN MINISTER WANTED TO ASK THAT THIS MATTER BE REVIEWED AT
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HIGHEST LEVEL IN DEPARTMENT. ISRAEL WANTED TO ASSURE POSITION IT WAS TAKING WAS NOT REGARD AS SOMETHING AUTOMATIC; IT HAD SERIOUS LONG- AND SHORT- RANGE OBJECTIONS. ON PUBLIC ASPECT OF MATTER, ISRAEL HAD OF COURSE BEEN OBLIGED TO STATE ITS POSITION ONCE U. S. DECISION SURFACED; BUT IT HAD BEEN CAREFUL TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN ITS AGREEMENT WITH OVERALL THRUST OF AMERICAN POLICY AND ITS OBJECTIONS TO SALE OF F-4 S. ISRAEL WAS REQUESTING THAT ITS CONCERNS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY AND THAT MATTER BE REVIEWED AND RECONSIDERED BY USG.

6. DEPSEC REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE AND HARMFUL TO BOTH U. S. AND ISRAEL IF FALSE IMPRESSION WERE GIVEN TO PUBLIC THERE WAS CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US OVER F-4 SALES. WE HAD NO DESIGN TO CHANGE OUR POLICY RE ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST; RATHER, OUR DESIGN WAS TO STRENGTHEN THAT POLICY. NOTING THIS MORNING' S WASHINGTON POST HAD CARRIED REPORT OF INDIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO

IRAQ, DEPSEC RECALLED HIS CONVERSATION WITH SHAH OF IRAN WHO HAD EXPRESSED FEAR OF IRAQI DESIGNS IN PECS AN GULF AREA AND INDIAN DESIGNS ON PAKISTAN, BOTH WITH SOVIET HELP. SHAH FELT SAUDI ARABIA MUST BE STRONG; HE WOULD EVEN LIKE ALLIANCE WITH IT. - IT WOULD BE MOST UNFORTUNATE IF SAUDI ARABIA WERE TO FALL UNDER FRENCH INFLUENCE WITH OURSELVES DISPLACED AND U. S. OIL COMPANIES ELIMINATED IN MIDDLE EAST AND LIBYA, AND OTHERS TAKING OUR PLACE. IF WE WERE TO SELL F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE WOULD BE REASONABLY SURE THAT THEY WOULD BE KEPT IN SAUDI ARABIA. IF FRENCH WERE TO SELL MIRAGES TO SAUDI ARABIA, WE WOULD LOSE STRONG CARD FOR MAINTAINING OUR POSITION AND OUR OIL INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST; AND IF WE WERE WEAKENED IN AREA OR DRIVEN OUT, CAUSE OF PEACE THERE WOULD BE JEOPARDIZED. WE BELIEVED THAT WE WOULD STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN AREA

AND CAUSE OF PEACE THERE BY SELLING F-4 S TO SAUDI ARABIA. WE FELT ISRAEL ITSELF WOULD BE BETTER OFF. THIS WAS OF COURSE MATTER OF JUDGMENT AND ISRAEL WAS RIGHT TO MAKE ITS CONCERNS KNOWN TO US. WE THOUGHT OUR DECISION WAS

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CORRECT ONE, HOWEVER, AND WE WOULD NOT HAVE TAKEN IT OTHERWISE. IN OUR VIEW, MAJOR THING WAS THAT THIS DECISION NOT BE TAKEN AS INDICATION OF CHANGE IN OUR POLICY OR AS BRINGING ABOUT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US. THERE WERE BASICALLY NO DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF THIS WERE TO BECOME CAUSE CELEBRE. IN HIS PERSONAL OPINION, DEPSEC SAID, IF WE WERE TO REVERSE DECISION, DANGER WOULD INCREASE AND SECURITY OF ISRAEL BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED. MORE WE HURT IN AREA, MORE ISRAEL IS HURT.

7. DINITZ REITERATED THAT ISRAEL DID NOT DISAGREE WITH OVERALL U. S. POLICY. IT WAS NOT SAYING THAT U. S. SHOULD NOT SUPPLY ARMS TO SAUDIARABIA AND KUWAIT. ISRAEL WAS INTERESTED IN IRAN AND HAD BEEN DOING SOMETHING ITSELF IN VARIOUS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FIELDS TO HELP IRAN. ISRAEL WAS INTERESTED AS WELL IN ETHIOPIA. ISRAEL SHARED ETHIOPIA'S CONCERNS RE SOMALIA AND THOUGHT IT WOULD BE WISE IF U. S. VIEWED ETHIOPIA ALSO AS PIVOT IN THAT AREA, AS PARTNER IN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM. WHAT WAS DISTURBING TO ISRAEL WAS MATTER F-4 S. ISRAEL SAW NO COMPARABLE DANGER IN SALE OF MIRAGES. ITS INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES WERE THAT SALE OF F-4 S WOULD NOT STOP SAUOIS FROM ACQUIRING MIRAGES; THERE WAS IN FACT HIGH PROBABILITY THEY WOULD DO SO. F-4 S WERE MOST ADVANCED TYPE OF AIRCRAFT AND MAINSTAY OF ISRAELI DETERRENT POSTURE. ISRAEL DID NOT WANT TO SEE ITS PSYCHOLOGICAL POSTURE WEAKENED. IT NEVER DOUBTED U. S. INTENTIONS THAT F-4 S WOULD NOT BE

TRANSFERRED TO OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES. BUT IT DID NOT THINK THIS COULD BE GUARANTEE. HE NOTED SISCO HAD SAID IN TESTIMONY ON HILL THAT IF U. S. WERE TO SELL F-4 S TO SAUDIS, IT INTENDED RECEIVE GUARANTEE THEY WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED, BUT NO ONE COULD GUARANTEE SUCH TRANSFER WOULD NEVER TAKE PLACE. WHAT WE SEE TODAY IN MIDDLE EAST IS COMMON MARKET IN ARMS. EGYPT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS MIRAGES FROM LIBYA, HAWKER HUNTERS FROM IRAQ AND IS IN PROCESS OF GETTING LIGHTINGS FROM SAUDI ARABIA. ISRAEL SIMPLY COULD NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY F-4 S WOULD GO TO EGYPT OR EGYPTIAN PILOTS WOULD GO TO SAUDI ARABIA TO FLY THEM.

8. CONTINUING, DINITZ SAID THERE WAS INTELLIGENCE ASPECT

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NOT TOUCHED ON IN ISRAELI NOTE. IT MADE DIFFERENCE TO ISRAEL IF ARABS WERE TO HAVE F-4 S ON HAND THEY COULD STUDY. ISRAEL WANTED U. S. TO UNDERSTAND WHY IT WAS GENUINELY

CONCERNED. THIS WAS NOT PROFORMA THING. IT SAW WHOLE ARRAY OF STRATEGIC, INTELLIGENCE, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS. IT WANTED U. S. TO TAKE ITS CONCERNS INTO CONSIDERATION.

9. DEPSEC ASSURED DINITZ WE DID GIVE ISRAELI VIEWS FULL CONSIDERATION. ISRAEL ATTACHED GREAT VALUE TO F-4 S AS POLITICAL AND MILITARY WEAPON. SAUDIS SAW PLANES AS HAVING SIMILAR VALUE TO THEM IN THEIR EFFORTS TO KEEP PEACE. IN ARABIAN PENINSULA AREA, WE SAW OUR PROVIDING F-4 S AS MAJOR FACTOR IN MAINTAINING OUR POSITION IN SAUDI ARABIA AND OUR INFLUENCE THERE. BEST GUARANTEE THAT PLANES WOULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO EGYPT WAS FOR U. S. TO HAVE STRONG PRESENCE IN SAUDI ARABIA AND BE CONSIDERED BY SAUDIS AS GOOD FRIEND. THIS WAS IN OUR SELF- INTEREST AND ULTIMATELY IN ISRAEL' S INTEREST AS WELL. IF WE THOUGHT IT WOULD CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER WE WOULD NOT DO IT. OUR PROVISION OF F-4 S WOULD IN ITSELF GIVE US PRESENCE AND INFLUENCE THAT WOULD BE IN BOTH ISRAEL' S INTEREST AND OUR OWN. AHERTON ADDED THAT OUR F-4 S DECISION WOULD HELP US HELP FAISAL WITHSTAND PRESSURES TO POLITICIZE OIL QUESTION. DEPSEC SAID FAISAL WAS INDEED UNDER GREAT PRESSURE AND HAD TO RESIST. RUSH

UNQUOTE. RUSH

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